Roles and Moral Reason in Stoicism

There’s a lot of discussion online about the ethics of Stoicism, but there’s infrequently any discussion about the various aspects of Stoicism that underpin or justify Stoic ethics.

It’s ethical to “live according to Nature,” but why?

It’s ethical to look after your family and community, but why?

It’s ethical to fulfill your various duties and positions in society, but why? And also, how do you determine what those duties and positions ought to be in the first place?

The ethics of Stoicism are a result of the philosophy more than they are part of it.

I’ll probably be hanged by my toes over a pit of rabid academics for saying that, but it’s what I think. I believe, had they been asked, it may have been how the Ancient Stoics thought about it as well.

We want to acquire the knowledge of how to live excellently. The strategy for moving closer to that goal (for progressing) is contained wholly within the Ethics topoi of our philosophy. But how the founders of Stoicism figured the ethics out, that, in my opinion, is the real philosophizing.

If the ethics are the actionable bits, then the physics and the logic are the rich soil from which those actionable bits were grown. This is why A.A. Long said that the ethics of Stoicism were/are parasitical on the physics of Stoicism (and why a Stoic cannot coherently justify their practice without accepting those physics – unless they find a way to justify them differently, which no one has yet done).

The physics of Stoicism include a uniquely defined, wholly naturalistic God — and this can make Long’s entirely true and accurate statement awkward and problematic for any contemporary Stoic who believes Stoicism is compatible with an atheistic or agnostic view of the universe. It’s not. Unless, that is, one positions themselves as a Stoic who needs no justification for their ethical position. For me, however, that seems an intellectual transgression far worse than accepting the Stoic’s non-God.

I say “non-God” because, if I don’t, you’ll think I’m talking about the supernatural variety of Gods from, for example, the Abrahamic, Pagan, or Eastern traditions. These conceptualizations of God are not anything like the conceptualization of God that the Stoics had. The Stoic God was something more like quasi-personified, functional stability of the cosmos.

But I digress. This episode isn’t about the Stoic God; it’s about Roles, what they are, and where they come from. Let’s move on.

What are Roles in Stoicism?

Roles refer to the various positions or responsibilities an individual occupies in life. There are four categories of roles:

1. Natural Roles: These are roles given by Nature. There are very few of these, the most prominent being “rational human being.” Others include child, sibling, family member, etc.
   

2. Assigned Roles: These are roles that one takes on by choice or circumstance, such as being a student, teacher, professional, or friend.
   

3. Individual Talents and Dispositions: Stoics consider personal talents, skills, and inclinations when determining one's roles. Acting in ways that utilize one's strengths and abilities is seen as part of fulfilling one's natural purpose. Athlete might be one of these; or educator, horseback riding instructor, or artist, for example.
   

4. Contextual Roles: These are roles that arise in specific situations or contexts, such as being a traveler, a guest, or a citizen. These roles are temporary but are roles nonetheless. An example might be “protector” when someone finds themselves witnessing a bully pushing around a little kid. They aren’t “a” protector, but they might become a protector in that moment and only for that moment.

The identifying of one’s roles is a process that starts with the psychological theory of Appropriation (known to us as “Oikeiôsis”). There are two stages of such appropriation:

1. Self-Appropriation: Initially, individuals identify with their physical bodies and strive to maintain their well-being. As they mature, they recognize their rational nature and align their actions with reason.
   

2. Social Appropriation: Individuals then recognize their connection to others, starting with family and extending to humanity, non-human creatures, and then Nature as a whole. This recognition guides them to fulfill roles based on their relationships and rational capacity.

The first stage isn’t relevant to this conversation because we’re already well into the second stage as (presumably) adult human beings. We’re already aware of our connection to others and are attempting to suss out our roles as we keep that understanding in mind.

This is what Hierocles’ Circles of Concern diagram is supposed to help us navigate.

What roles do we have?

We have the role of individual, rational human being. This is the fundamental, foundational role. In order to embody it, we must choose to progress toward the attainment of Virtue. This is a role every human being has, but it is not a role every human being seeks to fulfill (see Epictetus and his madmen). There are other roles we can elect to appropriate within the “self” circle (or that can be assigned by Nature). Examples include roles that result from having a natural talent or inclination.

We have the role of family member. We are a son or daughter, we cannot escape this role. Whatever other roles we identify within our circle of “family” (or whatever roles we might take on or be saddled with, for example: “caregiver”) cannot work against the roles within the circle of “self.” Any familial role which would necessitate the abandonment of our role as a rational human being is a role that shouldn’t be appropriated.

We have the role of friend. The same rules apply.

We have the role of member of a society. Again, the same rules apply.

Same for the role of “member of the human species.”

Same for the role of “entity of nature.”

And this works in reverse, as I’ve shown elsewhere with the Pyramid of Concern. The roles we elect to take on as individual humans cannot work against our roles as family members, friends, community members, members of the cosmopolis, or inhabitants of the natural world.

This means there are some roles we cannot, justly, assume

Assuming the role of an armed robber, for example, in order to “support” our siblings in their endeavor to become rich, works against our role as a rational human being. It is not rational to harm our community by robbing a store that serves it. This is an example of how assuming roles beyond the self can harm the self by making us irrational and therefore vicious.

But the opposite can also be true. There are roles we can elect to take on as individuals which can harm our families. The appropriation of such roles would then also harm the self because the choice to act irrationally within any sphere of concern beyond the self, necessitates a vicious choice being made in the mind, which is the self, and so makes us irrational and vicious.

Such an example might be the assuming of the role of reclusive hermit.

We might believe that assuming such a role in order to focus on the study of texts and the practice of meditation, would be just. We might believe that the ascetic life is the purest form of dedication to learning about and understanding Virtue.

In reality, since we cannot fulfill our roles in any other circle if all of our time and attention is focused on the self, such a choice would work against our role as, for example, a sibling. We cannot have an appropriate relationship with a sibling (or with our family) if we never see or communicate with them.

This is the fundamental difference between Stoicism and Cynicism: Cynics believed Virtue was the only Good, but only the Stoics believed both that Virtue was the only Good and that the pursuit of it required participation in society (and these circles).

On a larger scale (larger than self or family), we cannot assume the role of “dumper-of-toxic-sludge-in-the-Amazon” (a job, in this example, so a role within the community) just because it pays well and we need to support our family because to harm nature is irrational and thus works against our role as rational human beings (and probably many other roles).

And here we ask and answer a difficult question

What if dumping sludge in the Amazon (or doing anything that works against nature or my role as a rational human being) is the only way we can get money to feed our family?

The answer is not one most people find tenable, but it is what it is: our family starving to death is an indifferent thing in concern to our pursuit of Virtue.

I will make this make sense to you before this edition is through. For now, though, take a few deep breaths because I know that was hard to read. I know you recoiled.

Deep breath in. Hold it. Long breath out.

The point of you living, isn’t your living — nor is living the point of anyone else’s living.

Human beings die, that’s unavoidable. Vicious things happen, this is also unavoidable. Our value, if we want to use that word, is not determined in how we die (or when, or why) or that others die as a result of [anything].

Instead, our value is determined by the quality of our moral character. To destroy nature for the sake of our family is to prioritize our family over the health of the thing which sustains every member of our species. This kind of behavior isn’t just selfish (even if we all view it as being understandably selfish) it’s also irrational because it suggests that what matters isn’t moral reason of our choices but the outcomes our choices lead to.

For example: If I reason that it is appropriate for me to slow my car down to avoid running over a turtle who is crossing the road, and the person driving the car immediately behind me happens to be looking down at the radio at the exact time I choose to (safely) slow and stop my vehicle, the resulting car accident that kills the other driver, and the turtle, and permanently cripples my passenger, isn’t what determines whether my choice to slow down for a turtle was just, moral, or “right.”

Judging our moral character by the yardstick of outcomes isn’t Stoicism; it’s Utilitarianism.

Is it rational to harm nature, thus to harm other inhabitants of nature (both human and non-human) for the sake of benefiting our family which, in this example, lives thousands of miles away from where our harming of nature is being done?

The key word here is “rational”

If we’re Stoics, rationality is central to our lives. We strive to be perfectly rational in our choices and behaviors — meaning we’re meant to prioritize the bigger picture over the narrowly-framed one right in front of us.

To a lot of people, this is untenable because to truly let go of the desire for power over things we cannot choose is to, at the same time, find comfort with outcomes we do not prefer. Stoic ethics are not black-and-white; they are incredibly contextual, as I’ve said dozens of times in the past, but they are somewhat rigid in what is and isn’t immoral behavior. It is immoral to choose viciously.

Let’s put together a few extreme examples to prove that we already agree with the Stoics that moral character is expressed through our choices and not the outcomes of our choices.

In a room with a madman

Imagine we are standing in a room with two other people. One of these other people is an infant child. The other is a vicious criminal, a terribly evil man. This vicious man has the barrel of a loaded gun pressed against our head. He tells us he’s going to kill us if we do not strangle the child to death. If we do, we will be allowed to live. If we don’t, we will die but the child will live.

This man is vicious and insane but, for the sake of this experiment, he’s extremely honest and will keep his word with no sneaky technicalities getting in the way of our interpretation of his words.

Here, I have no doubt, we would allow ourselves to be killed so that the child could live and go free. Each of us might have different reasons for making this choice, but the Stoics would have just one reason: that, in this scenario, it is not morally appropriate to kill an innocent to save ourselves. The aim of our life is not to live, but to live excellently. When we are backed into a corner and must choose between living viciously and living excellently, the Stoics insist that we choose to live excellently – even if that means dying as a result of choosing to do so.

Let’s reimagine the scenario. There are now four people in the room: ourselves, the vicious man, the infant child, and the family member we love most in the world. The vicious man tells us we must strangle the child to death or our beloved family member will be killed. Regardless of the choice we make, we will live. This tests whether we can harm humanity in order to benefit family.

This might seem more complicated, but it isn’t. We cannot choose to kill the child in order to save our family member because to do so would be to suggest something irrational and thus immoral: that the outcome of our choices is the yardstick against which our virtue is measured. We have a choice to make, and no matter how we present the choice, no matter how many scenarios we dream up, if we choose to do something unjust, irrational, or illogical in order to ensure an outcome we understand to be a preferred indifferent, we are essentially saying that outcomes are more important than morals.

Let’s take one more scenario. Again, there are four people in the room. This time we are joined by the vicious man and two infant children. And, this time, the proposition is that if we do not strangle child A, child B will be killed. If we refuse to strangle either child, both will be killed. This tests whether we can harm the humanity circle in order to serve it.

Like I said before, no matter what the scenario, we cannot choose to abandon Logic and Reason in navigating it if our aim is to live excellently. We cannot choose to act viciously in order to pursue an outcome we prefer. In this scenario, to choose to kill one child to save another is to suggest not only that there is a difference between the moral value of these lives, but also that living is the point of life. In this scenario, if we wish to live excellently, we cannot choose to kill either of these children because to choose to do such a thing would be illogical and irrational. If, however, we could sacrifice our own lives in order to save them, if that was an option given to us, the logical and rational choice would be to do so.

🕊️ Let me offer an olive branch before continuing…

I understand that these are crazy scenarios that would never be the case. They’re like scenes from the “SAW” movie franchise! They are completely nonsensical.

In reality, the vicious man would not be able to limit our choices to such extents. In reality, the appropriate choice would almost always be to try to overpower the vicious man and save everyone in the room.

But why? Why would that suddenly be the case, Tanner? Why do outcomes suddenly matter?

They don’t. Outcomes don’t matter. Which is exactly why I’ve just said that, in reality, we would try to overpower the vicious man. We might fail, and he might kill everyone, but what is the measure of the moral appropriateness of our choices?

Is it the outcomes?

No, it is never the outcomes.

The measure of the moral appropriateness of our choices is always the justness and rationale driving those choices. If we reasoned that we had a good chance at saving everyone, and we chose not to try because of the potential negative outcome, what would that say about our character? It would say that we were the sort of person who determined whether choices were good based on their outcome and not on their well-reasoned and just intent.

We would be the sort of person who only acted morally when we thought acting morally would result in ideal outcomes.

But imagine the men who stormed the beaches of Normandy on D-Day.

Certainly, there was a collective, hoped-for, utilitarian outcome in mind, but do we think any individual involved in that offensive made the choice to be brave only because they thought they’d live? Or only because they believed the operation would be a success? 

I’d be willing to bet that nearly everyone involved in that offensive was both certain they would die and mostly uncertain it would be successful at all.

When we make our choices based solely on what outcomes they might lead to, we live as cowards or opportunists. When we make our choices based on moral reason, we live excellently.

How do we identify and appropriate our roles?

We now know what sort of roles there are. We also know that we cannot assume roles in any circle which conflict with the roles we’ve assumed in any other circle. The most proximal role, the one we can never be in conflict with, is the role of rational human being. And, as we’ve seen, this means we cannot assume the role of “irrational actor” in order to chase outcomes we’d prefer. We cannot choose to be vicious when being vicious results in a reality we prefer.

It’s important to understand that no one is a sage, and so none of us will perfectly identify our roles or fulfill them. We are only trying to become a morally perfect being; we don’t expect to actually become such a thing. We use the ideal to motivate us toward betterment; we do not frame it as a finish line or a goal that, if not reached, means we have failed in life.

So how do we select our roles? It is, actually, easy. We need only ask ourselves four questions, and then reason logically to answer them:

First: What is appropriate for me, as a human being, to appropriate as my own to be concerned with within the circle of self? If I’m a Stoic, the answer is: the role of progressor toward the knowledge of Virtue. This is the role of the Prokoptôn; of the rational human being.

Second: What is appropriate for me, as a Prokoptôn, to appropriate as my own to be concerned with within the circle of family? The answer is: my family members. The roles could be child, sibling, uncle, aunt, cousin, etc. These roles are not avoidable within a family. If you have cousins, you’re a cousin. If you’re a cousin, you have the role of cousin. How the role of cousin is fulfilled depends on the contexts within your family. If you live next door to your cousin, the appropriate fulfillment of that role will look different than if you live in Japan and your cousin lives in Turkey. You have to reason yourself through how to fulfill your familial roles well – but you cannot deny them.

Third: What is appropriate for me, as a Prokoptôn and family member, to appropriate as my own to be concerned with within the circles of friends and community? I am a friend, that’s unavoidable if I have friends. I am a member of my community if I live in a community (again, unavoidable). How do I be a good friend? I must reason it through. How do I be a good member of my community? I must reason it through. Does it mean I have a job? Well, then, I must assume the roles of taxpayer, employee, and, imagining the job is Firefighter, firefighter. Do these roles prevent me from fulfilling my roles within the more proximal circles? No? Then they are appropriate. Yes? Then they are inappropriate.

Fourth: What is appropriate for me (as a Prokoptôn, family member, friend, member of my community, taxpayer, employee, and firefighter) to appropriate as my own to be concerned with within the circles of Humanity and All of Nature? How do I be a contributing member of the human family? How do I be an appropriate inhabitant of nature? I must reason it through. Perhaps I am an exceptionally good firefighter, and maybe I have a knack for teaching, and so I volunteer as part of a global non-profit that holds training seminars for volunteer firefighters twice a year in India and Brazil. Perhaps I am an eloquent speaker, or a great writer, and I encounter an opportunity to participate in a local demonstration to prevent the paving over my local park to build a Walmart. Here I might elect to take on the role of advocate or activist.

And after we have done all this we must stress test our roles in reverse.

Does being an advocate or activist for nature cause me to behave viciously toward humanity? Does being a volunteer instructor twice a year cause me to behave viciously toward my community? Does having a job as a firefighter cause me to behave viciously toward my friends or family? Does being a friend to someone cause me to be vicious toward my family? Does the way I fulfill my role as cousin cause me to act viciously in my capacity as a progressor?

It’s inside-out and outside-in. All roles assumed in each circle must consider whether they necessitate any viciousness in fulfilling the roles assumed in that same circle and also the next immediate circle toward the outside and the next immediate circle toward the inside. But it is also the case that every single role assumed in every single circle must consider its necessitated impact on every other single role assumed in every other single circle, even the ones that aren’t immediately next door.

Like I said at the outset, we cannot assume the role of toxic-waste-dumper in our community when doing so necessitates vicious behavior in our roles as progressor (two circles in from Community) and as “inhabitant of nature” (two circles out from Community), just so we can chase a preferred outcome that, itself, is vicious to pursue as it damages our character.

The Stoics flatten all the complexity into a simple position: the only mistake you can make is to reason unjustly (immorally, illogically, wrongly), and no instance of unjust reasoning is more or less vicious than any other.

Joyfully kicking a stork’s nest because you unjustly reason that it is appropriate to take joy in destroying an animal’s home is exactly the same moral error as burning down a library because you believe such an action is the appropriate response to that library carrying books that hold opinions you don’t agree with.

It’s the same mistake and it’s the only mistake we are capable of making.

It’s the only mistake we’re capable of making because, in the context of the causal chain within which we exist, it is the only thing we can control. That’s why, in the car crash scenario from earlier, I did not make the mistake of causing an accident because I cannot choose the outcomes which result from my choices.

Thanks for reading.